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“Taking the Human out of Human Rights“
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Abstract   What interest me are the reasons why “human” or “human rights” 
could be important or possibly most important in constituting a group (hence 
the introduction of the complicated word “group” and “group right(s)” in the 
subtitle). If I had to justify the existence of the latest debates on nature, justi-
fication and universality of human rights, on their distinction from other nor-
mative standards, on the philosophy and (legal) foundation of human rights, 
on “Human Rights without (or with) Foundations” (Raz, Tasioulas, Besson), 
then I would immediately conclude that this “process of grandiose concretization” 
of a complete fabrication is far from over. Despite the innumerable pacts and 
international conventions established after World War II, the slew of obliga-
tions to which states have agreed in the last few decades, the establishment of 
rights to secession or humanitarian intervention it is as if the constitution of 
classification of basic human rights and their universality is far from over.
Key words: human rights, group, group rights, declaration, international legal 
human rights
At the moment it is not at all certain wether a text that features terms 
such as “human rights,” “human,” “human propriety,” can be completed 
in a satisfactory manner, nor indeed whether it will be of use in the con-
struction of a theory of the institution or “contre-institution,” which is 
what interests me presently.ͱ Upon spending several months of reading 
1  It would appear that the phrase ‘counter-institution’ was first used by Saint-Simon. 
“Il en est résulté [du passé historique] que les Anglais se sont en même temps soumis à 
deux organisations sociales bien distinctes, qu’ils ont, dans toutes les directions, doubles 
institutions, ou plutôt qu’ils ont établi, dans toutes les directions, les contre-institutions 
de toutes les institutions qui étaient en vigueur chez eux avant leur révolution et qu’ils 
ont conservées en très grande partie.” Cf. Simon 1859: 131. In one of his last texts, “Le 
modèle philosophique d’une ‘contre-institution’,” Jacques Derrida gives seven basic 
characteristics of the counter-institution, keeping steadfastly in mind the idea of Col-
lège and Cerisy (l’experience contre-institutionnelle de Cerisy): the counter-institution 
is non-governmental in origin (d’origine non gouvernementale); it does not have war 
or resistance to any other institution as its mission; philosophy, although omnipresent, 
does not dominate over other disciplines; it is international; it does not confer honor-
ifics or titles, academic or professional; it ensures space for expertise and experimenta-
tion; finally, we never know what awaits us in counter-institutional space, because it 
holds within itself pre-institutional space, space prior to norm (that which is ‘incalcu-
lable’, this being the word repeated several times in this text). Derrida 2005: 248, 
253–255. This paper was written as part of project no. 43007 funded by the Ministry of 
Education, Science and Technological Development of the Republic of Serbia.
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various declarations, protocols, conventions, charters on human rights, 
various texts on human rights, written in various languages, coming from 
disparate traditions – all that I can do is to explain this borrowed title (as 
it is a quoteͲ) and subtitle, in an effort to problematize “conceptual im-
perialism,” present in different interpretations of human rights. Perhaps 
this could orient me towards a possible line of argument on the impor-
tance of the attribute “human” or “right to the human” within the con-
stitution of a group and collective work (cooperation) within an institu-
tion. First, what interests me are the reasons why “human” or “human 
rights” could be important or possibly most important in constituting a 
group (hence the introduction of the complicated word “group” and 
“group right(s)” in the subtitle). Whatever I should at present leave aside, 
yet which is implicitly always present in any thematization of human 
rights, refers to the long tradition of concretization of a bit of nonsense 
and fiction that has been taking place for nearly two and a half centuries.ͳ 
If I had to justify the existence of the latest debates on nature, justifica-
tion and universality of human rights, on their distinction from other 
normative standards, on the philosophy and (legal) foundation of human 
rights, on “Human Rights without (or with) Foundations” (Raz, Tasioulas) 
(John Tasioulas’ A Philosophy of Human Rights is expected to come out 
2  The title is a remake of Allen Buchanan’s 2006 “Taking the Human out of Human 
Rights” (a text reissued in Buchanan 2010: 31–49), which was later turned around by 
Tasioulas 2010: 647–678. My intention is certainly not to oppose Tasioulas’ efforts to 
ground human rights in morality, nor to renew Buchanan’s criticism of Rawls (on the 
contrary, Rawls’ attempt to ground human rights on the idea of cooperation seems 
constructive to me, with a right to association and emigration particularly important). 
Rather, my intention is to note the problem of the relation or the tension between 
the terms “Human” and “Right(s).”
3  There are different readings of “Déclaration des droits de l’homme et du citoyen” 
by Joseph de Maistre, Edmund Burke, Jeremy Bentham (Bentham calls the declaration 
a “manifesto”), Marx, all the way up to Alasdair McIntyre or Bernard Williams. (In his 
1987 “The Standard of Living: Interests and Capabilities,” in The Standard of Living, 
ed. G. Hawthorn, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987, Williams writes: 
“The notion of a basic human right seems to me obscure enough, and I would rather 
come at it from the perspectives of basic human capabilities”) Williams 1987: 100. All 
these readings above all question the existence of personal rights (subjektive Rechts), 
“man” as such, as a legal subject and the legitimacy of what today, from the perspec-
tive of biopolitics, we might call “the naked life” or “the simple or naked man.” Hegel’s 
formulation is at the root of these phrases: he mentions the right to life or a right to 
live (Das Recht des Lebens) in paragraph 118 of his lectures on the Philosophy of Right, 
held in Heidelberg’s winter semester of 1817-1818, Hegel 1983: 221–222. The right to 
live (the commandment “Thou shalt not kill” implies an existence of some such right) 
or the right to live freely is protected by law such that “the rights of liberty rest simply 
upon the supremacy of the law – they are law, not personal rights.” Jellinek 1901: 53. 
Jellinek explains that before the declaration, in 1765, “in spite of his fundamental 
conception of a natural right, the individual with rights was for Blackstone not man 
simply, but the English subject.” Ibid., 56. 
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shortly, as is Samantha Besson’s A Legal Theory of Human Rights) – then 
I would immediately conclude that this “process of grandiose concreti-
zation” of a complete fabrication is far from over. Despite the innumer-
able pacts and international conventions established after World War 
II (the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted in 1948, 
whereas the Convention on the Right of the Child was adopted in 1989), 
the slew of obligations to which states have agreed in the last few 
decades, the establishment of rights to secession or humanitarian in-
tervention (it is possible today to intervene forcefully in order to protect 
the human rights of certain ethnic groups – paradoxically, it is possible 
to kill people in the name of free life of other people, entirely in har-
mony with various protocols and pacts followed by “signatories”) – it is 
as if the constitution of classification of basic human rights and their 
universality is far from over.
Why is this so? For two reasons. One of the correct answers to the ques-
tions why do people have human rights and what are they could be that 
people actually have their rights or human rights because a multitude of 
states has agreed on the Universal Declaration. However, not all states 
have agreed to and signed the international conventions (immediately 
taking away from the universality of the Declaration, as well as from hu-
man rights, which thus become instantly subjective normative evaluations 
not establishing any universal obligation). Not only that, but the Declara-
tion has created space for a differentiation between democratic and non-
democratic states (Rawls, Christiano), or between more or less democrat-
ic states. And perhaps most importantly, the Declaration as such (as a 
document) establishes neither procedures nor bodies or institutions for 
the protection of human rights. This is directly under the auspices of pol-
iticians and lawyers (not philosophers) and concerns an insufficient em-
phasis on what Buchanan calls “international legal human rights.”ʹ The 
4  In Buchanan 2013 insists on the construction of a very specific system of interna-
tional legal human rights (an act which would certainly suppose the establishment 
of institutions and an even greater curbing of state sovereignty), and investigates in 
detail all existing theories of human rights. One of these is a book by James Nickel 
Making Sense of Human Rights (2007 saw the publication of a revised version). Buchanan 
writes in the introduction of his book: “James Nickel states that the human rights of 
today are “the rights of the lawyers, not the philosophers,” and he too recognizes that 
international legal human rights need not mirror pre-existing moral human rights. 
However, in my judgment he does not focus sufficiently on the question of what it 
would take to justify having an international legal human rights system, where this 
includes an account of why there is a need for individual rights at the international 
in addition to the domestic constitutional level and an examination of the legitimacy 
of international legal human rights institutions.” Nickel 2007: 4.
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second reason refers to (again using Buchanan’s words) “conceptual im-
perialism” of philosophers who definitely insist, and in particular so when 
it comes to human rights, without any argument, that there is “only one 
concept of human rights (namely, theirs).”͵ No doubt, philosophers are 
incredibly exclusive when it comes to an understanding of human rights.Ͷ
Philosophers routinely use the phrase “human rights” without making 
it clear weather they are talking about moral human rights or inter-
national legal human rights. This is unhelpful, especially if one of the 
goals of a philosophical theorizing is to explain the relationship between 
moral and international legal human rights.ͷ
To this distinction between philosophic speech on moral human rights 
and international legal human rights, I would like to add another reason 
for caution that could possibly help facilitate the understanding of the 
significance of the term “human” for the harmony itself between an in-
dividual and a group, and in general, for the construction of a group as 
such. Namely, I would here assume that the rights of the individual could 
have a significantly greater potential and efficiency exclusively if they were 
publicly declared and manifested in a group (vocally, clearly, publicly or 
collectively), and not despite the group or in opposition toward a group. 
In that sense, moral rights of the individual do not necessarily have to be 
independent of the law (or international legal human rights), presenting 
some kind of basis for criticism of the very same law, and therefore be in 
disharmony with the rules of the group or be opposed to institutions. Law 
need not at all be the means an individual uses against the repression on 
the part of other entities (Nozick, Dworkin), but just the opposite, a 
means for achieving harmony with others (Raz). It seems to me that in-
troducing an instance that refers to other individuals and equal rights of 
others, and thus collective or group rights, could improve the normative 
potential of law held by each individual in seeking to affirm and preserve 
its own humanity (and vice versa, the human potential each individual 
possesses in seeking to affirm and preserve its right to be part of a group).
5  Buchanan 2013: 10.
6  Of course, this exclusiveness on the part of philosophers has nothing to do with 
the cynical comment by Edmund Burke about the lack of existence of any use of 
debating a professor of metaphysics about abstract rights to food or medicine. Burke 
says that in those situations it is better to seek cooperation of the peasant or doctor. 
Onora O’Neill analyses this fragment at the very beginning of “The Dark Side of Human 
Rights”, O’Neill 2005: 427–428.
7  Buchanan 2013: 12. In a famous lecture from 2002, “Why Invent Human Rights” 
and probably the most complex text on human rights ever written, published in 2004 
as “Elements of a Theory of Human Rights” Amartya Sen 2004: 315–356), Amartya Sen 
speaks in the conclusion about the necessity of public debate and critical inquiry of 
human rights that surpass the borders of states.
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Let me now assume that speech about human rights or declarations 
(publicly and always collective, of a group: “We the people...”) regarding 
the right of each individual of a group implies a few models that hold the 
group together, connected, and also give right to a group. Instead of a 
model, I could mention a few unconditional conditions for the existence 
of a group as such. Further, I would attempt to claim that the Declaration 
as such (or various declarative acts or declarations as documentary acts) 
is the very establishment of the protection of the individual and that it 
guarantees its freedom.
The first model or condition for the existence of a group concerns the 
guarantees for the protection of life or right to life and freedom of all its 
members or parts. A group is a group only if it protects, always for a 
limited time, the basic rights of the individuals who comprise it. How-
ever, this protection is produced by the very members of a group. The 
protection of human rights as a basic or minimal condition of collabora-
tion and joint living would be conducted by encouraging the rights of 
individuals to collaborate and protect the ties that hold the group to-
gether. Human rights exist if and only if they serve to protect the ties we 
establish with other individuals (responsibilities and commitment).͸
The following model – and the reason human rights should never lose 
this eminent legal register or legal protocol͹ – refers to the nature of law 
to connect and bind all those who are or are not present, who participate 
and cooperate in a group.ͱͰ My right also represents a responsibility to-
wards another or for others, and vice versa. “Rights involve counterpart 
duties: I only have a right to X if someone else is under a duty to me with 
respect to X” (Tasioulas, Raz). The duty to be human therefore always 
refers to the right of another.
Finally, the last and for us most important model, also the most im-
portant part of this brief presentation, refers to the Declaration as a 
  8  Human rights speech is de facto speech about a minimum, a minimum of rights 
and a minimum of humanity. A theory of human rights is a “minimalistic theory” 
(Cohen), sometimes described as “the minimalism of human rights” (Buchanan), and 
at other times as having a “minimalistic character” (Griffin). Nickel writes: “Human 
rights are not ideals of the good life for humans; they are rather concerned with ensuring 
the conditions, negative and positive, of a minimally good life.” Nickel 2007: 138. 
  9  Human rights are not principles, nor are they “das Prinzip einer andren Politik” 
(Ch. Menke), nor a practice or “die Bewegung einer Praxis entbildet.” Menke, Raimondi 
2011: 9, 18.
10  Here I am giving a version or a rewording of a famous maxim by the Physiocrats: 
“Qui dit un droit, dit une prérogative établie sur un devoir; point de droits sans devoir 
et point de devoir sans droit.” [To claim a right is to claim a prerogative based on a 
duty; there can be no rights without duties and no duties without right.”]
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document,ͱͱ that is, a written document. Human rights are above all 
constituted as a declaration, as a text that binds all who sing and publish 
it. This recognition by all produces the deontological power of this 
document and, at the same time, the power of the group as such. The 
Declaration is possible exclusively in the form of “we,” such that the 
declaration constitutes the rights of all at the same time as the constitution 
of the group or the community of all. When all declare (assert) them-
selves regarding the rights of all individually, on human rights – this is 
when they become constituted as a “we,” a group. However, since human 
rights are published in the form of a declaration, these rights are also at 
once permanently declared and interpreted. Therefore human rights 
exist in the form of an explanation of their own essence and are the sum 
of various declaratory acts. A permanent explaining of the word “human” 
is in fact part of the great and eternal project of human rights.ͱͲ
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Petar Bojanić
„Oduzeti ljudsko iz ljudskih prava“
Rezime
In te re su ju me raz lo zi za što bi „ljud sko“ ili „ljud ska pra va“ mo gli da bu du 
va žni ili even tu al no pre sud ni u kon sti tu i sa nju jed ne gru pe (to je raz log za što 
sam u pod na slo vu ovog tek sta uveo kom pli ko va nu reč „gru pa“ i „pra va gru-
pe“). Sve ono što bih u ovom tre nut ku tre balo da osta vim u re zer vi, a što je 
im pli cit no uvek pri sut no u sva koj te ma ti za ci ji ljud skih pra va, od no si se na 
du gu tra di ci ju kon kre ti za ci ja jed ne be smi sli ce i fik ci je ko ja se oba vlja već 
sko ro dva  i po sto le ća. Ako bih tre bao da oprav dam po sto ja nje naj sa vre me-
ni jih ras pra va o pri ro di, oprav da nji ma i uni ver zal no sti ljud skih pra va, o nji-
ho vom raz li ko va nju od dru gih nor ma tiv nih stan dar da, o fi lo zo fi ji i (prav nim) 
ute me lje nji ma ljud skih pra va, o „ljud skim pra vi ma bez (ili sa) ute me lje njem“ 
(Raz, Ta si o las, Bes son), on da bih od mah za klju čio da ovaj „pro ces gran di o zne 
kon kre ti za ci je” jed ne iz mi šljo ti ne uop šte ni je za vr šen. Bez ob zi ra na bez broj 
pak to va i me đu na rod nih kon ven ci ja ko je su usta no vlje ne po sle Dru go ga 
svet skog ra ta, na mno štvo oba ve za dr ža va pot pi sni ca ko je su po kre nu te po-
sled njih de ce ni ja, na usta no vlje nje pra va na se ce si ju ili hu ma ni tar nu in ter-
ven ci ju, kao da kom plet na kla si fi ka ci ja osno vnih ljud skih pra va i nji ho va 
uni ver zal nost još uvek ni je ni do ka za na ni kon sti tu i sa na.
Ključ ne re či: ljud ska pra va, gru pa, pra va gru pe, dekla ra ci ja, me đu na rod na 
le gal na ljud ska pra va
